Baby Fae, in her short life, highlighted a growing trend in medicine -the use of animal parts in the treatment of humans. While transplanting a baboon's heart into a baby girl is by far the most dramatic, it is only the latest of many occasions where animal organs have been put to work for our benefit. Surgeons already tap animals for so-called 'spare parts', using sheep intestine for surgical sutures, cow tendons and bones to replace human ones damaged in accidents, and heart valves from pigs to repair human hearts.
Our technical capacity to turn the bodies of animals into vehicles for growing replacement parts for humans appears limited only by the imagination of medical researchers who, in the wake of the Baby Fae experiment are hailing her operation as facilitating further animal experimentation. Their eagerness gives new imagery to the Orwellian notion of 'Animal Farm'. Already there is movement to establish baboon farms where colonies of primates can be raised to supply hearts for xenografts. Less modest minds enthusiastically envision unlimited possibilities in harvesting a variety of organs for human use (1) .
Despite a perfunctory nod to the importance of respecting moral restraints in our relationships to animals, the prevailing sentiment overwhelmingly prefers human lives over those of animals. As reportedly articulated by Dr Leonard Bailey, Baby Fae's surgeon, we can either choose to let babies die or intervene and thereby sacrifice -regrettably -some lesser form of life (2) .
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What should we think of these alternatives? If we agree with a Los Angeles Times editorial that .'Medicine's goal is to reduce suffering and preserve life' (3) are we being too picayune to inquire as to whose pain and what kind of life?
Consider the following purposefully extreme fictional media report of the future. Examining it logically may offer a way of developing some much needed principles to govern cross-species transplantation:
The National Bio-Research Foundation announces their colony of mentally handicapped persons being bred to become transplant donors has reached 2,500. Each year about 200 individuals are supplied to some 25 scientific facilities. Dr Homograft, a spokesmanfor thefoundation, explains that the use of home-bred mentally handicapped humans rather than earlier simian candidates results in many more lives being saved and returned to normal functioning because of the vastly more compatible tissue matching in human-to-human procedures. Besides being medically superior, the mentally handicapped are also more plentiful since they procreate well in captivity. Dr Homograft emphasised that the donors were treated with respect at thefoundation.
This hypothetical report strikes us as unforgivably cruel and an abhorrent perversion of medical technology. It should be noted, however, that the language of the report is only slightly modified from descriptions of how baboons are presently raised for research in the United States. Is there a logical and moral justification for our lack of squeamishness regarding the use of primates and other non-humans; or, is our attitude simply a popular prejudice which favors 'us' as opposed to 'them'?
Equality and Speciesism
In looking for fair treatment guidelines, morality demands that we presume equal treatment This raises the important point that where the usual difference between human and non-human does not exist, we cannot justify different moral treatment in the distribution of either benefits or burdens. Ifwe treat an individual human who lacks the cognitive ability humans normally possess, or are capable of developing, as if the quality were present, and consequently treat the human differently from an ape of the same level, then such an act would exemplify speciesism. That is, the act would allow unequal treatment of equally cognitive beings by an appeal solely to a difference in species. In contrast, the Principle of Equality demands that where a morally relevant difference between human and primate is absent, there is no moral justification, other things being equal, for treating the two with anything other than equal consideration.
The 'other things being equal' clause should not be disregarded since not only is the development of cognition a matter of gradation with respect to the phylogenetic scale, it is also a process in an individual's life. In this respect, potentiality becomes an issue. A child, incapable of discernment, possesses limited cognitive ability, as does a mental incompetent. But in contrast to the mentally impaired, under normal conditions, the child is potentially a fully cognitive being and must therefore be regarded as having a certain importance, if not because of what it is, at least because of what it might become. It is the view here that the stringency of our duty to preserve an entity is directly proportional to not only the individual's actual possession of complex cognitive skills, but its potential to achieve them as well.
How might what has been said so far apply to admittedly imaginary transplant cases? Let us suppose that there are three needy organ recipients. Each possible recipient needs a different organ (for example, a heart, a kidney and a liver), which according to all possible matching procedures, can best be supplied by either of the other two. Thus, in order to save two lives, one must be sacrificed; and, if the organs of one are not used for the remaining two, all three will die (4).
In the first scenario the three would-be recipients are two humans with normal cognitive capacities, one adult and the other a young child; the third is an adult baboon with full primate capabilities. Which organs should be used? Our duty to preserve the mature human is more stringent than our duty to preserve the life of the young child, since the former has full actual possession of value characteristics (5), whereas the latter does not, and the child does not have the potential to attain more value than the amount the adult already possesses (6) . Our duty towards the human child is stronger than that towards the baboon because, although the latter may have more actual value than the former, the child has potentialities that far exceed those of the monkey. Thus, the baboon in this case is the best donor from a moral perspective.
The second situation consists of a normal human adult, but in this case the human child is retarded to the degree that its cognitive capacity is reduced to the same level as that of the baboon. As before, the adult human would not be the appropriate donor for the reasons outlined above. The situation between monkey and child has significantly altered since, being of comparable cognitive capacities, both actual and potential, they now share an equal claim to the needed organs.
Equal claim would suggest that the matter could be decided by lot; but deciding an issue ofsuch magnitude in some chance fashion seems radically counterintuitive. Perhaps this appears so only because it is easy to imagine the child with a network of relationships all of which would suffer if the child dies, a fabric of concern assumed to be missing in the monkey's case. If this is factually true, then the child does have a higher claim based strictly on consequentialist grounds because of the adverse affect the child's use and death would have on others. But if it were possible to show that the baboon had a similar network, comparable in terms ofwarnith, interactions and attachments to those of the retarded human, then the balance would revert back to equal claim shared by monkey and child (7) . And, if it could be demonstrated that the baboon had, in reality, a closer network of relations than the child (the latter being an orphan abandoned in an institution, for example), the shifting weight of the consequences would suggest the human child be sacrificed to benefit the baboon (8) .
Morally permissible alternatives
If we are correct that present transplant and research practices cannot rationally be defended, in what ways can our attitudes be changed to blur the distinction between valuing a human life while devaluing the life of a non-human with the same cognitive abilities? There are two possibilities that might be considered.
First, we could change our attitude towards our own species so that we would think it is morally permissible to use a human for research, experiment or operation only if we presently feel morally justified in using a non-human of equal cognitive capacity, or equal value, for the same procedures. By adopting this attitude we would not only condone the use ofthe baboon heart for Baby Fae, but we ought to be equally ready to take the heart of a mentally handicapped human of similar standing for her benefit. Few of us, however, are prepared to embrace such a radical departure from our present treatment of the mentally disadvantaged.
The second possibility would be to hold constant our present protective concern towards members of our own species, but change our attitudes toward animals so that we consider it morally permissible to use a nonhuman for research, experimentation or operation only if we would presently find it morally permissible to use a human with equal cognitive capacity for the same procedures. Viewed in this way, our inclination is to conclude that the baboon's heart could not be used for xenografts since we would not condone the sacrifice of a retarded human with equal cognitive capacity.
Thus, two conclusions can logically be drawn. The first, considerably more radical than current practice, allows the use of mentally retarded adults in medical experiments; while the second, more conservative than current practice, prohibits the use of fully cognitive primates in such experiments.
Since prudence dictates that where there is doubt on a moral issue, it is best to take the more conservative position; and since there is a general inclination not to use innocent life wantonly, we presume that the stronger claim is towards changing our behaviour towards non-humans more equally to reflect the concern and protection which we currently feel is warranted towards members of our own species of comparable cognitive level.
By conjoining the alternatives described above, it is possible to establish both necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of non-human animals. donors and research subjects to volunteers plus those creatures without the capacity for individual lives, future transplants and experiments would have to be greatly curtailed. Most organisms that fall below the level of self-awareness are in fact so different from our own species that they are essentially useless for those purposes.
There are some alternatives, however, which not only eliminate some of the moral dilemmas discussed here but at the same time actually enhance the practical possibilities for success. Specifically, why not use individuals who have suffered brain death, patients in irreversible comas, and infants born with anencephaly (11)? None of these groups possess, either actually or potentially, the cognitive capacities that would make it possible for them to lead individual lives as they have been discussed above.
Currently those who meet the criteria for brain death, which in the United States requires the entire brain including the brain stem to be dysfunctional, are used as organ donors but not for invasive research procedures. If these cadavers are considered appropriate sources for organs and other body tissue, there appears no logical difference in using them also for research in place of the conscious, rational, sentient beings presently sacrificed for these purposes.
Permanently comatose individuals, while not meeting the criteria for brain death either in the United States or in Britain, since they do have minimal brain stem activity, are maintained indefinitely on respirators or, as Karen Ann Quinlan did for so long, breathe on their own but with no hope of recovering consciousness.
While there seems no defensible reason why in the case of irreversible coma the individual could not be used for both organ donation and experimental research, there are two caveats that need to be considered. First, because perception of pain may involve the cerebral cortex and in irreversible comas there may be some degree of cerebral function, the degree to which this is an actuality in any particular case would have to be taken into consideration to ensure procedures would be painless. Secondly, when children are involved the determination of irreversible coma is much more difficult to ascertain. What can count as reasonable medical certainty in adults may not be applicable in children. For this reason, children who appear to be permanently comatose should not be included in either the organ donor or research subject categories.
There are, however, children who would qualify as both organ donors and research subjects: anencephalic infants. Because the entire cerebral cortex is missing in these children, there can be no perception of pain. Thus, the precautions that would apply to irreversibly comatose adults used for research would serve no purpose in these situations (12).
The proposal advanced here regarding the brain dead, irreversible comas and anencephalic infants could be implemented under (i) a compulsory programme, (ii) a presumptive programme allowing exceptions, or (iii) a consent programme. Under a compulsory programme, the brain dead, the irreversibly comatose, and anencephalic infants would be used automatically and irrebuttably as organ donors and research subjects where appropriate. Such a programme has the advantage of providing an abundant stock of donors and subjects which might facilitate important and useful medical advances. However, the programme's disadvantages undoubtedly militate against its implementation: violation of religious freedom, denial of First Amendment rights and excessive State intrusion in individuals' lives and deaths.
Under a presumptive programme allowing exception, the brain dead, the irreversibly comatose, and anencephalic infants would be presumed to be available for use as organ donors and research subjects, but the presumption would be rebuttable. That is, such subjects would be routinely available for the appropriate medical experimentation unless they had previously registered their objection or, possibly, members oftheir immediate family had registered such an objection. Such a programme mitigates the disadvantages of a compulsory programme, while producing more subjects for medical transplant and experimentation than those provided by a pure consent programme. Under a consent programme, the brain dead, the irreversibly comatose and anencephalic infants would be presumed not to be subjects for medical experimentation unless they had registered prior willingness. (In the case of infants or young children the consent of immediate family members would serve as a substitute.) Such a programme supports individual autonomy, but would probably result in far fewer available subjects for medical experiments than the first two programmes.
We have no vehement objections to the implementation of a presumptive programme allowing exceptions provided that all potential subjects and their families have ample prior opportunity to register their objections to their potential use as subjects in medical transplants and experiments. However, we fear that in practice the poor, the uneducated, and the politically and legally disenfranchised would bear a disproportionate burden under such a programme. In effect, it is likely that only the advantaged segments of society would be aware of their options and the details of registering formal objections to a State programme. Accordingly, only the advantaged segments of society would truly be in a position to exercise the autonomy sc highly valued by advocates of this programme.
A consent programme -the most conservative ofour three possibilities -is our preferred selection. Contrary to our immediate intuition, such a programme might well produce an adequate number of subjects for medical transplants and experimentation if its implementation was supplemented by massive public education and vigorous support on the part of the medical community. Taking what would seem to be should also be mentioned that the force of slippery slope arguments alone is almost never conclusive in ruling against the legitimacy of a moral principle.
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